While this is true, it is easily understood for those who see that an " if a being is sentient, then it has rights" principle has no logical implications for non-sentient beings, such as early fetuses, plants, bacteria, etc. An understated lesser goal of the book may be to show that those who accept animal rights need not think that early fetuses have rights and that abortion is wrong: there is no inconsistency in that position. It's unclear how saying something like, "Let's see how arguments about abortion and animal rights can help us understand the other topic, even though most abortions aren't wrong," supports the book's overall goal. And, despite their recognition of the value of sentience, they don't emphasize that it is wrong to harm human beings because of their sentience, and so whether fetuses are human beings or not does not, in itself, settle much, contrary to many pro-lifers.Īpart from the limitations of their discussion of abortion ethics, I found it overall odd that the authors offered such a strong judgment on the morality of early abortions, given the book's main goal of using each issue to illuminate the other. It is also at times weak: e.g., they don't offer an analysis of "human beings" to argue that (human) fetuses are not human beings, and they sometimes waver between humanity and personhood. Their review of anti-abortion arguments is not comprehensive: e.g., they don't consider arguments that abortion is wrong based on duties concerning, but not to, fetuses, such as duties to future or potential persons. They tentatively conclude that aborting pre-sentient fetuses is not even prima facie wrong.
They also argue that (biologically human) fetuses are not "human beings" and that being human is, in itself, not morally relevant. They argue that never-been-sentient beings, like early fetuses, lack interests and that there cannot be moral obligations to beings without interests: they cannot be harmed. While pro-lifers believe that aborting sentient fetuses is wrong, they claim that aborting non-sentient fetuses is equally wrong.Ĭolb and Dorf reject the pro-life view, as they present it. Pro-lifers argue that fetuses and embryos are morally considerable and have moral rights from conception or soon after, far before they are sentient. The "pro-life" movement needn't deny this, but it maintains that being human or a "human being" is another sufficient condition for both moral considerability and basic moral rights. Colb and Dorf propose that inflicting serious harms on sentient beings is morally wrong unless done for a good, justifying reason. In chapter 1, "Sentience or Species?" Colb and Dorf propose that sentience is a sufficient condition for moral considerability: their examples of killing male layer chicks (who don't produce eggs and so are worthless to the egg industry) by grinding them up and sticking scissors into a six-month old unborn fetus's skull to kill him, and the apparent pain involved in each, illustrate that actions affecting sentient beings are morally significant. The second part has three chapters concerning advocacy: what means should and shouldn't activists use to seek their ends? What, if any, graphic visual images should they present? Should they ever use violence? A conclusion mostly addresses controlling animal reproduction.
The first part of the book has an introduction and four chapters on ethical, and occasionally legal, issues concerning the treatment of animals and abortion. While the authors hope to use insights from one issue to shed light on the other, I find that differences in the issues limit these insights. Animals are sentient, early fetuses are not, and so the moral arguments about the two issues don't overlap or share premises. later abortions affecting sentient fetuses, while rare, raise serious moral concerns, but these abortions - like all abortions - invariably involve the interests and rights of the pregnant woman, which can make these abortions morally permissible.įor a book claiming to explore the "connections" between debates about the two issues, just the summary from the book flap - basically, what's above - makes it appear that there really isn't much connection between the topics, at least at the core ethical level.most aborted human fetuses are not sentient - their brains and nervous systems are not yet developed enough for sentience - and so the motivating moral concern for animals doesn't apply to most abortions.many non-human animals, at least vertebrates, are morally considerable and prima facie wrong to harm because they are sentient, i.e., conscious and capable of experiencing pains and pleasures.
0 kommentar(er)
